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The scientific consensus is that substantial reductions in global carbon dioxide emissions must begin 
very soon if dangerous climate change is to be avoided.1 While many regard the Paris climate 
agreement as a landmark in international climate cooperation, others have warned it will be unable to 
drive the necessary emission reductions due to inherent shortcomings that are difficult to overcome 
without further international negotiations.2 Three main shortcomings are: (1) The Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs) do not add up to something even close to the 2°C target, let alone 
the more ambitious 1.5°C target.3,4,5,6 (2) Their voluntary character may encourage countries – 
including those within the relatively ambitious EU – to free-ride, developing weak national policies 
that do not meet their pledges.7,8 (3) The lack of global coordination of national climate policies is 
likely to cause various adverse systemic effects: carbon leakage due to a shift of carbon-intensive 
production to countries with less stringent climate policies9, triggered by differing ambitions of NDCs 
among countries; and rebound of energy conservation under lax climate policies due to additional 
uses of high-carbon goods/services.10,11,12 
An optimistic stance is that reviewing and revising NDCs every 5 years, as planned through 
the “ratcheting mechanism” of the Paris Agreement, will increase their ambition. That may be true, 
but it will not undo their voluntary character, inviting non-compliance and free-riding. Because 
emission reductions are expected to be costly and climate change is a shared global externality in both 
its causes and effects, there are strong economic incentives for countries to free-ride on emission 
reductions taken by others. It can only be overcome through a global agreement that binds countries 
to implement consistent and effective climate policies, which will also avoid the aforementioned 
systemic effects. Many countries are unlikely to implement sufficiently stringent and mutually 
consistent measures unilaterally because domestic climate benefits are generally small and 
outweighed by the costs of a weaker competitive position. Benefits will, moreover, mainly arise in 
the long term, while costs are incurred at more short notice. While the Paris agreement has 
undoubtedly taken an important step forward to act cooperatively on the threat of climate change, 
because of the free-rider problem, targets are much harder for countries to commit to than 
 
internationally agreed-upon policies. In the long run, the target approach is much less effective than 
policy coordination, especially if the latter includes a form of carbon pricing.  
This article hence argues that a logical next step in international climate negotiations is to 
move the UNFCCC in the direction of global carbon pricing. This involves two mutually reinforcing 
tracks: first, setting up a specific type of climate club, namely on carbon pricing; and second, directing 
UNFCCC negotiations towards global carbon pricing. While many countries have implemented a 
carbon tax or market13,14, the absence of international climate policy coordination and legitimate fears 
of loss in competitive position15 prohibit such unilateral initiatives from resulting in sufficiently high 
carbon prices. The parallel tracks define a course along which the international community can more 
rapidly achieve globally consistent and high carbon prices, essential for averting dangerous climate 
change. 
 
1. Unique advantages of carbon pricing 
Carbon pricing has been championed by a broad range of economists and policy-makers, including 
traditionally conservative as well as progressive ones, for a variety of reasons.16,17,18,19,20,21, Well-
designed carbon pricing will quickly and effectively alter the composition of market-based 
consumption and production, the main sources of CO2 emissions, from high- to low-carbon 
goods/services. Economic studies – using different methods – estimate that compositional changes 
alone contribute to more than 50% of required emissions reduction in coming decades.22,23,24 Carbon 
pricing will in addition steer the direction of innovations towards energy-efficient and low-carbon 
production life cycles, which could achieve the remainder.25,26,27,28 
 Carbon pricing can be implemented either as a tax or a market for emissions permits. A single 
carbon price, defined per ton of C or CO2, is able to modify trillions of decisions by consumers, 
producers, investors and innovators, by simply making high-carbon options more expensive than low-
carbon alternatives. It is implemented where fossil fuel – whether coal, oil or gas – is taken out of the 
ground or imported from a country that has not implemented a carbon price. Any intermediate and 
 
final product or service would then obtain a price that reflects all carbon dioxide emissions generated, 
namely by aggregating all carbon-pricing effects along the entire production cycle.29 As illustrated by 
Figure 1, this unique systemic nature of global carbon pricing, i.e. its ability to cover the entire 
economic system, assures complete control of emissions, preventing excessive leakage and rebound, 
while steering innovations most effectively towards low-carbon technologies, goods and services. 
Because carbon pricing accounts for heterogeneity of abatement opportunities and costs among 
polluters, it further minimizes society’s overall cost of pollution control.30,31 
Carbon pricing does not rely on environmental consciousness or altruism of consumers and 
firms – price incentives would naturally steer them towards low-carbon options. This is not to deny 
that environmental consciousness should be fostered as well. Most importantly, perhaps, it will help 
to create political support for carbon pricing.32,33,34,35 But even in the unrealistic case that the large 
majority of consumers in the world wished to reduce high-carbon consumption voluntarily, the 
massive amount of information required to accurately identify low-carbon goods would greatly 
handicap their ability to do so. The modern-day consumer can choose between a very large variety of 
goods produced by complex and highly varied life cycles with global coverage and distinct carbon 
intensities. Carbon pricing is essentially a form of decentralized public policy, meaning low 
information needs and costs for governments. This is a clear benefit compared to, for example, 
technical standards. The latter would need regular updating to keep up with future technological 
change, while they would have to be defined (and regularly updated) for millions of distinct products 
and services, to prevent carbon leakage due to producers or consumers shifting from regulated to 
unregulated technologies.  
A carbon tax is arguably the easiest way to implement a carbon price, and entails the lowest 
bureaucratic costs. It is not to be confused with currently existing fuel taxes that typically do not 
reflect the carbon content of a fuel. In the absence of carbon capture and storage, currently still very 
expensive, of highly uncertain potential36, and enjoying low public acceptance37, any carbon extracted 
from the ground in the form of fossil fuels intended for energy use will eventually end up in the 
 
atmosphere in the form of CO2. Therefore, rather than directly taxing hard-to-monitor CO2 emissions, 
it is much easier to tax fossil fuels in relation to their carbon content as this translates proportionally 
to CO2 emissions through their combustion. This way, only a handful of firms need to administratively 
pay the carbon price, instead of millions of polluters further on in the supply-demand chain. The 
resulting cost of carbon is then straightforwardly included in the price of intermediate and final 
goods/services and passed on through existing markets and cost-accounting from firm to firm and to 
final consumers. 
The ability to gradually adjust emissions reductions through a single, centralized price 
mechanism also offers a uniquely powerful device to keep reductions in tune with advances in natural 
and social climate sciences. Carbon pricing allows simple adjustments to account for variations in 
global emissions and atmospheric concentrations, uncertainty about the precise impact of emissions 
reduction on climate change, and new scientific insights about climate change. While difficult to 
respond to these in an agreement based on targets (as Paris), it could be achieved fairly easily by 





Figure 1. Systemic effects of carbon pricing guaranteeing substantial CO2 emissions reduction 
Notes: (i) Some complementary instruments are shown for illustrative purposes – others are mentioned in the 
text. (ii) Black arrows indicate interactions that are often ignored, leading to an underestimation of the 
effectiveness of carbon pricing. (iii) Some arrows are dashed to avoid confusion about the direction of crossing 
arrows. 
 
2. Unfounded scepticism and absence of effective alternatives 
Despite broad-spectrum support by most economists, many climate policy studies by social scientists 
ignore the unmatched effectiveness of reducing emissions through carbon pricing.38,39,40,41 This could 
 
be called ‘carbon-pricing denial’. Instead, they tend to suggest some form of bottom-up solution 
through voluntary and local action42, or a rigid scheme of person carbon limits intended to promote 
global equity.43 Under the latter approach consumption by rich and poor would become equally 
limited. While ethically admirable, it would face immense political resistance. 
A widespread idea is that eco-labelling, supported by LCA studies, will allow consumers to 
voluntarily reduce their carbon footprint.44 However, limited human capacities of altruism and 
information processing mean this approach cannot deliver large-scale emissions reduction.45 In 
achieving local, bottom-up climate solutions, also cities are frequently mentioned.46,47 Not denying 
their potential contribution, they only exert direct control over a limited portion of total emissions 
generated by industry, electricity production and consumption. Moreover, the implementation of 
uncoordinated policies at the subnational level may generate carbon leakage. Complementing 
subnational initiatives with carbon pricing will reduce their detrimental systemic effects, which will 
improve their effectiveness. 
It is often taken for granted that subsidies for research and deployment of new technologies 
contribute to reducing emissions. Without carbon pricing, however, we cannot ensure that the full life 
cycle of new innovations will actually use less carbon.48 For instance, the production cycles of 
particular batteries for electric vehicles or specific solar PV panels might be unnecessarily intensive 
in carbon dioxide emissions, often relying on cheap coal power for manufacture, which would delay 
a low-carbon transition. More generally, production of cleaner technologies generates emissions in 
an economy that is still running mainly on fossil fuel energy. To limit the carbon-intensity of such 
production, subsidies fall short – we need to penalise the dirty next to rewarding the clean if we aim 
for a quick low-carbon transition. One can see this by considering the Kaya identity49: CO2 emissions 
= carbon intensity of energy (CO2/energy) x energy intensity of the economy (energy/GDP) x income 
level (GDP/population) x population. Subsidizing renewables will only affect the first factor, i.e. the 
carbon intensity of energy, while a carbon price will simultaneously influence the first and second 
factors, i.e. also the energy intensity of the economy. 
 
These remarks do not deny the need for a broader policy package going beyond carbon 
pricing. Information provision can garner understanding of, and support for, carbon pricing. 
Behavioural nudges can address informational failures and bounded rationality, for example, by 
presenting a low-carbon product as the default option for consumers.50 Non-price regulatory 
instruments are needed to control certain non-energy GHG emissions, such as from land conversion, 
deforestation and landfills. Innovation policies are required as well, to ensure further development of 
promising low-carbon technologies which are still too expensive to compete in markets. The main 
justification of public sector support is well-known, namely that R&D has positive externalities and 
knowledge spill-overs. But it cannot address the climate externality – for this, carbon pricing is the 
most effective climate policy. That is, subsidies for technological innovation and adoption cannot 
stand alone.51,52 
 
3. Ensuring equitable outcomes with carbon pricing 
There is much confusion about the equity dimensions of climate policy in general and carbon pricing 
in particular. While the concern is often expressed that carbon pricing is inherently inequitable, if well 
designed, it can actually be one of the most equitable instruments of climate policy. Contrary to other 
regulatory instruments like quotas, technology standards or renewable energy subsidies, carbon 
pricing generates revenues that permit compensation of low-income households or international 
transfers from rich to poor countries. This holds true not only for carbon taxation, but also for 
emissions trading, as revenues can be raised by selling or auctioning permits. Compensating for 
inequitable consequences of carbon pricing does not mean eliminating pre-existing inequality. It 
would evidently be unfair to impose such an ambitious condition on any climate policy. 
Public perception studies indicate that the use of revenues can be critical for social and 
political acceptance of carbon pricing.53,54 The specific context of a country may determine which 
recycling scheme is the best choice to enhance acceptance.55 For example, if equity concerns are 
paramount, a uniform lump-sum recycling may be most appropriate. On the other hand, earmarking 
 
revenues for green expenditures might be fitting when citizens question the environmental benefits 
of carbon pricing. It would be preferable, though, to explain to them that its main effectiveness lies 
in emissions reduction. 
The discussion about an international redistribution of revenues from a global carbon price 
could take place within the already agreed approach for financial support to low- and middle-income 
countries decided in Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to the UNFCCC and confirmed in Paris. This 
commitment involves mobilizing US$100 billion per year in climate finance during the period 2020-
2025. Considering that annual CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use represent more than 30 billion of 
tons56, a global tax of, e.g., 30US$ per tonne of CO2 would generate revenues close to 1% of Gross 
World Product (GWP). The carbon price to stabilize global emissions to remain within 2°C warming 
by 2105 could even generate revenues up to 6% of GWP. Hence, carbon pricing can deliver huge 
funds for potentially reducing inequality and poverty.57 Of course, as time goes by, households and 
firms will shift away from carbon-intensive products and services, causing revenues to decrease, 
unless the tax rate is revised upward. But there will then also be less need to correct for inequity as, 
along with reduced revenues, inequality effects will diminish. 
In judging distributional effects of carbon pricing, one should further take into account that 
other climate policy instruments can have considerable inequitable consequences. For instance, 
technical standards make products more expensive equally for those with low and high incomes, so 
creating a relatively higher cost for low-income households, without generating revenues to 
compensate for this. In addition, subsidies for renewable energy use up public revenues rather than 
generating them, so cannot compensate for any adverse distributional effects they cause. Inequitable 
effects depend on their specific design, in terms of beneficiaries (e.g., car or home owners) and 
financing arrangement (e.g. general budget vs. taxes on electricity consumption). While one cannot 
generalize, there is evidence that untargeted subsidies for solar PV result in a transfer of income from 
society to relatively well-off homeowners, with private benefits in the latter group further biased 
towards wealthy households with large houses.58 Similarly, subsidies for wind energy favour land 
 
owners, particularly those holding large parcels suitable for wind mills, while subsidized electric 
vehicles disproportionately benefit households who can afford relatively expensive cars. 
 
4. Track 1: Design of a carbon-pricing club 
One promising route towards a carbon-pricing agreement which overcomes political barriers is to 
establish a ‘carbon-pricing club’ among countries with an ambition to implement effective policies. 59 
This is a special case of what in the literature is known as minilateralism60 or providing club goods61. 
A carbon-pricing club would coordinate policies or carbon markets62 in member states and apply a 
border carbon tariff on imports of goods and raw materials from non-members and possibly reimburse 
carbon expenses for exports. Domestic firms would then not face a competitive disadvantage in 
domestic and world markets vis-à-vis competitors from countries outside the club.63 Non-member 
countries would feel an incentive to join the club and implement a carbon price. Moreover, non-
cooperation could stimulate citizens and environmental NGOs to lobby with their government to join 
the club.64 History offers successful cases of clubs expanding to a global agreement, such as the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, covering 23 members at its start in 1947, transforming into 
the World Trade Organization with 164 country members.65 
Two recurrent critiques have been levied at border carbon tariffs. The first concerns its legal 
feasibility under WTO-GATT rules. While several authors have argued that carbon border tariffs can 
fit with WTO rules, others disagree.66 The only way to resolve this is having the WTO rule on an 
initiative undertaken to form a climate pricing club. It is likely to generate media and political 
attention, which as a beneficial side effect might stimulate international debate on how to align the 
WTO with the need for environmental/climate protection. The second critique relates to practical 
implementation. At first glance, designing an effective border tax adjustment seems a very 
complicated task. It should take into account the total emissions associated, directly and indirectly, 
with the production of each good. Ideally, such emissions should be measured by accounting for the 
technology of foreign countries. However, taxing emissions based on the domestic technology, easier 
 
to assess by the countries in the club, is already a good step towards levelling the playing field. That 
is, it would be enough to estimate the ‘avoided emissions’ for the club members when they import a 
good instead of producing it.67 
To circumvent the complexity of designing carbon border tariffs, Nordhaus proposes a 
uniform percentage tariff on all imports from non-participants, which would serve as a sanction on 
non-participation in the club. 68 Model simulations indicate that this proposal would provide 
incentives for many countries to join the club and implement a carbon price, although it would not 
solve the problem of distinct impacts on competitiveness for different economic sectors. In this light, 
we think it is important to investigate more how carbon border tariffs can be designed to reflect – at 
least approximately – the heterogeneous carbon intensities of goods, as this could help to reduce free 
riding, avoid leakage and protect competiveness.69 
By applying a uniform carbon price in its member states and some type of border tariff for 
other countries, the club could serve as a transition vehicle toward a full participatory agreement on 
a global carbon price. The larger the club – in terms of people, trade power and emissions – the more 
attractive for non-members to enter it, as more countries would regulate carbon-intensive imports and 
so free-riding would become less beneficial. Club membership could further be encouraged by 
creating specific membership benefits, as far as allowed under WTO rules – such as close mutual 
financial support and cooperation in trade, low-carbon innovation and science – creating positive 
spill-overs between members.70  
To signal that the carbon border tariffs would be motivated by concerns about climate change 
and not serve as a disguised protectionist measure or a source of public revenues, one could 
complement them with ‘revenue recycling offsets’71: tariff revenues would be returned to non-
member countries from whence the imports originated, to signal that the tariffs are to protect climate 
policies and not generate revenues in the club. The tariffs would then reduce import demand for 
carbon-intensive goods in the club member countries, while minimizing financial effects on import 
source countries. Possibly, these countries could be encouraged to prioritize the returned money for 
 
assisting their affected industries in adopting low-carbon production technologies.72 More generally, 
club members could monitor the use of revenues by non-member countries, to ensure that this 
provision does not create perverse incentives. Other suggestions for use of the money are provided 
by the literature on climate finance.73 
The club and its goals could be promoted, and new members invited, during UNFCCC COP 
meetings. This would also allow for the club to put pressure on UNFCCC climate negotiations, 
involving all countries, to make progress and move towards carbon pricing. In this way, the parallel 
tracks might exert mutual positive feedback. This is graphically illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Parallel tracks 
 
How could a carbon club take off? A few willing nations might start deliberations, such as 
 
those which make up a considerable part of global emissions and have ambitious climate goals or 
some form of carbon taxes or emissions trading.74 Some countries might be motivated to participate 
because of considerations related to national public finance or co-benefits.75 In reality, a club may 
already be emerging. In December 2017, France hosted a climate summit to which were invited the 
heads of state of all countries with a climate agenda that was considered sufficiently ambitious. The 
meeting was facilitated by the World Bank, a potential catalyser in the formation of a carbon-pricing 
club. 
A recent agent-based model simulation of climate clubs and their long term impacts found 
that a club initiated by the EU and USA would be particularly likely to grow to a size that reduces 
emissions effectively.76 Early participation of China and Japan would then almost guarantee success. 
A related study finds that clubs can function even without the participation of the US, as long as other 
major emitters show leadership.77 
 
5. Track 2: Four challenges for UNFCCC negotiations 
Working on a carbon-pricing club does not mean giving up on UNFCCC negotiations. On the 
contrary, these can be positively influenced by a successful club78, which would speed up the 
formation of a global carbon-pricing agreement. Negotiating a global carbon price has been suggested 
to be very difficult or even impossible. We argue that it is feasible and may even be fairly easy, that 
is, if countries are willing to give it a serious try. Four main considerations are relevant in this context: 
the ‘negotiation advantage’ of focusing on a carbon price, the specific instrument choice, the level of 
ambition, and the use of revenues. We address each of these issues in turn. 
Negotiating a carbon price is likely to be simpler than reaching agreements on climate 
technology standards or country-specific quotas. This is because carbon pricing, especially as a 
carbon tax, requires relatively little information for policy makers and polluters to act upon and, 
unlike the alternatives, reduces the potential for free riding. For instance, with binding national quotas, 
countries are rationally motivated to push others to accept a serious burden while trying to negotiate 
 
a lax burden for themselves. With technology standards, countries try to weaken these for sectors that 
are important to their economy, such as emission norms for cars. If all countries face incentives to 
free ride in these ways, it is unlikely that negotiations result in sufficient emissions reduction. This is 
well illustrated by the Paris Agreement: despite some ambitious NDCs, many countries offered rather 
weak ones, overall making it impossible for the Agreement to limit the temperature increase to 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels.79,80 
In contrast, when negotiating a unique global carbon tax, countries would know that a strong 
policy in the form of a high price would equally apply to all other countries. This would then reduce 
the incentive to free ride, making it possible for a fairly high price to emerge. In addition, whereas 
negotiations involving quantity pledges among some 200 countries means dealing with a 200-
dimensional coordination problem, focusing on a global carbon tax comes down to a simple one-
dimensional negotiation challenge.81 On the other hand, negotiating technical standards would mean 
an n-dimensional challenge with n denoting the number of carbon-intensive technologies in the world. 
Moreover, if not all n technologies would be part of the agreement, market distortions would result, 
hampering its effectiveness. 
In terms of instrument choice, the question is whether implementing a global carbon price is 
best achieved through a carbon tax or emissions trading. Each has its advantages and disadvantages. 
Many economists favour the tax because it is easier to implement, involves low bureaucratic costs, 
generates revenues on a regular basis, and can deliver a more stable price signal than a cap-and-trade 
scheme. Furthermore, one can then implement a steadily rising carbon price over time to allow for 
anticipation and adaptation by all economic agents. On the other hand, carbon trading guarantees a 
ceiling on overall emissions within a given time frame, is arguably less sensitive to political whims, 
and can automatically respond to economic changes in demand, technologies or abatement costs. 
A particularly strong argument in favour of emissions trading is that it does not suffer from a 
green paradox. This denotes a mainly theoretical insight that in response to an announced or expected 
increase in the carbon tax over time, forward-looking resource owners will expand the short-term 
 
supply of fossil fuels, provoking lower prices and larger demand. The cap in a carbon market will 
provide a hard limit to any intertemporal leakage.82 An alternative option to avoid the green paradox 
– though politically more difficult perhaps – is compensating a fall in the market price of fossil fuels 
by a higher carbon tax, to assure a non-decreasing price after taxes. Recent studies further argue that 
a divestment effect will weaken or even undo a green paradox effect.83,84 Here divestment signifies 
that forward-looking investors refrain from funding technologies and infrastructures with high carbon 
emission intensities as their use will become un-economic at some future date once stringent climate 
policy is implemented. This will alter the composition of the capital stock, in turn reducing derived 
demand for fossil fuels, especially under non-decreasing carbon prices. Hence, even if under the 
influence of an expected future rise in the carbon price short-term fossil fuel supply increases, fuel 
demand cannot fully respond as it is restricted by the divestment effect, in turn moderating the 
magnitude of the green paradox effect. An additional moderating effect is that short term supply of 
fossil fuels is limited by the time needed for investment in additional extraction capacity.85 
Incidentally, a green paradox can also occur without carbon pricing, namely in the presence of 
subsidies for renewable energy adoption.86 In this case, the compensating divestment effect is likely 
to be weaker. 
 Given that both carbon tax and market approaches have pros and cons, and that countries are 
experimenting with both, it is best to continue this path and learn more about both options. One can 
also combine the two instruments, to limit costs to carbon tax payers87,88,89 or to assure a minimum 
price in a cap-and-trade scheme, such as the UK carbon price floor.90 Critics of carbon pricing like to 
point out that early experiments with carbon taxes and emissions trading have not reduced emissions 
much. This was not due, though, to fundamental shortcomings of these instruments but to the lack of 
a global climate agreement that harmonises national policies. This then allowed for sub-optimal 
policies – taking the form of too low taxes, too high caps, or exemptions for various industries or 
excessive generosity in providing emission allowances. Such implementations have not followed 
economists’ textbook recommendations on these instruments. Moreover, some schemes were 
 
explicitly established with the objective to learn rather than achieve ambitious emission reductions. 
Witness the EU-ETS, which was initially designed to meet the rather unambitious Kyoto Protocol 
target. Indeed, politicians and policy makers in Europe have learned from experiences with existing 
carbon markets and are now proposing better implementation designs.91 In addition, many businesses 
and even some universities are undertaking carbon-pricing experiments, generally delivering positive 
experiences.92,93 
With regard to the level of ambitions, in the case of a carbon tax, we would propose to 
negotiate a carbon-pricing schedule starting with a global carbon price that is at least as high as the 
minimum of the carbon taxes or carbon market prices in the member economies. It would be desirable 
to aim for the highest of these prices, if the members were able to negotiate such an outcome. The 
starting price could then be increased regularly with an announced amount (e.g., US$10 every year), 
until emissions reduction conforms to the Paris climate target. The Swiss CO2 Law has implemented 
this type of design, in which the carbon price is automatically revised if the emission targets are not 
reached. A gradually rising schedule provides time for anticipation of long term investment decisions, 
and also allows voters to revise their beliefs on the tax effectiveness. The 2017 Report of the High-
Level Commission on Carbon Prices suggests that a carbon price necessary to reach the Paris 
objectives is in the US$40-80 range in 2020, rising to US$50-$100 by 2030.94 Other reference points 
can be derived from studies estimating the social cost of carbon, suggesting a lower bound of US$125 
per ton of CO2.
95 In case of a global tradable permit system, the carbon budget consistent with the 
2°C or even 1.5°C target should be guiding. One would best start with a lax ceiling (global cap) and 
then gradually lower this over time, resulting in a rising price schedule as well. 
Revenues of carbon pricing can be used for equity, innovation support or employment 
purposes.96 The precise balance between these is ultimately the outcome of political decisions and 
negotiations among countries. To increase acceptance and fairness of carbon pricing, one element is 
compensating inequity effects within countries. This could be done by using carbon price revenues 
to reduce labour taxes for low income groups or via lump-sum transfers. Another element is that rich 
 
countries compensate low-income ones to assure these can socially handle a global carbon price. 
 
6. A narrow time window 
Since 2015, oil prices have been at a relatively low level compared with the period 2005-2014. This 
may have been due to oversupply, driven by fracking and shale oil exploration in the United States 
and other countries, and strategic over-supply by Saudi Arabia to reduce competition. An alternative 
explanation – associated with the aforementioned green paradox effect – is the threat of rapidly falling 
costs of renewable energy options and the striking of the Paris agreement, both of which signal to oil 
producers a possible approaching end of the fossil fuel era. 
Carbon pricing would not just reduce emissions but also contribute to economic stability. A 
high carbon price would act as a buffer, leaving less room for oil price fluctuations, in turn providing 
a steady signal encouraging firms and individuals to undertake long-term investments in energy 
efficiency, renewable energy and electric vehicles, thus contributing to a rapid energy transition. In 
other words, we find ourselves in a unique time window with coexisting environmental and 
macroeconomic benefits to be seized. 
Without carbon pricing there is no good chance to stop climate change at any reasonable 
global temperature. To achieve carbon pricing at a global scale, we should advance on parallel tracks: 
UNFCCC negotiations should create room for talking seriously about a global carbon price schedule, 
along with redistribution-of-revenues rules; and countries with the most ambitious climate goals and 
policies should together form a carbon-pricing club along the lines sketched, which can then grow 
over time in membership and positively influence the UNFCCC negotiations. Since the time window 
is likely to be narrow, we should act swiftly. 
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